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“The Path to Prosperity in Afghanistan and Central Asia: Obstacles at the
Crossroads”
By Owen Lloyd
ABSTRACT
Despite America’s lengthy nation-building project in Afghanistan, many Afghans still lack the
basic resources and security necessary for a viable nation. Furthermore, the insecurity in
Afghanistan is increasingly spilling over into their neighbors, stressing an already fragile region.
While we in the West have largely forgotten Afghanistan, its neighbors look on with trepidation
as they prepare for potential unrest. With vast amounts of natural resources and increased
competition between the Russians and Chinese over the region, Afghanistan and its insecurity
could lead to continued Central Asian economic and political stagnation. Despite the dangers in
failure, inconsistent action and a destabilizing mission have plagued the U.S. Afghanistan
mission for ten years. If the U.S. is going to continue to be involved in state building operations,
a holistic plan that integrates cultural, political, military and economic policies must be
implemented and dynamically updated to suit the prevailing conditions. While the road to a
stable Afghanistan will be difficult, it is possible. Admitting defeat now will only create a more
costly and chaotic future for Afghanistan and its neighbors that we may not be able to afford.

By wisdom a house is built, and through understanding it is established; through knowledge its
rooms are filled with rare and beautiful treasures.
-

Proverbs 24:3

Afghanistan the Lynchpin
The success of an independent Afghanistan will be critical in the social and economic
development of Central Asia. The position of Central Asian nations at the crossroads between
Asia and Europe lends them an ever-growing importance in the shaping of the new global world.
Therefore, as the U.S. experience in Afghanistan continues to demonstrate, it is necessary to
understand this region and its inhabitants in order to make appropriate policy decisions.
However, the efforts of the U.S. in Afghanistan has thus far been plagued by inconsistent action
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and lack of coordination between civilian and military reconstruction groups, symptoms
stemming from the lack of an overarching plan. If the U.S. continues to act in this region of the
world, it must recognize the cultural, political, and economic elements that impede state-building
and regional development.

With increased globalization, the rise of hostile non-state groups, and persistent resource
scarcity, poverty and conflict pose dangerous consequences for the larger world community.
While Central Asia is kept nominally stable by autocratic leaders left over from the Soviet era,
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan all share destabilizing elements, capable
of leading to failed states and civil wars. As Afghanistan’s history aptly exhibits, failed states in
this region are easily compromised by groups with hostile intent towards the U.S. and its allies.
Additionally, despite a global economy that has enabled many formerly poor nations to reach
relative prosperity, much of Central Asia remains at medieval levels of development. The
principal danger is that further conflict will squander more human and natural resources,
depriving Central Asia of economic prosperity and derailing the wider Asian continent. With this
in mind, the dividends of wise foreign participation and systematic internal reforms will prove to
be immensely rewarding to Afghanistan and the region.
Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires
Afghanistan is a landlocked nation of desert steppe, extreme elevation changes, and fertile
valleys. While these features geographically isolate the country, it has long been a pivotal hub in
regional commerce and politics because it lies between the Far and Middle East. Numerous
historical and modern invasions attest to the tensions and liabilities implicit with life at the
crossroads. Historian Stephen Tanner argues that a geographic rather than a political map
explains why “Afghanistan’s claustrophobic passes have born mute witness to armies of
Persians, Greeks, Mauryans, Huns, Mongols, Moghuls, British, Soviets, and Americans -- among
others -- including many of the most famous captains in history.”1 This cyclical pattern of
invasion and associated phenomena is the most salient force in the shaping of Afghanistan, both
past and present.

It is no surprise that the formation of modern Afghanistan took place in the tumult of Russia and
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Great Britain’s imperial designs. Between Britain’s Indian empire and Russia’s desire to control
ever-larger swaths of Central Asia, Afghanistan served as a battlefield and buffer state, in
constant flux with the fortunes of the great powers.2 This so-called Great Game of Central Asia
led to Afghanistan’s other eponym -- graveyard of empires -- as neither the British nor the
Russians were ever able to fully subdue Afghanistan despite a century of attempts.3 The British
were the first to commit a pattern of blunders that would later haunt the Soviets and to an extent
hinder the U.S. endeavor in Afghan nation-building. Historian Louis Dupree attributes the
British calamity to “the occupation of Afghan territory by foreign troops, the placing of an
unpopular emir on the throne, the harsh acts of the British-supported Afghans against their local
enemies, and the reduction of the subsidies paid to the tribal chiefs by British political agents.”4
While it is fashionable to relate many current wars to aspects of older conflicts,5 in the case of
Afghanistan, a pervasive sense of déjà vu proves especially hard to ignore.6 The Soviet era was a
recent, clear, and documented instance of failed intervention and counterinsurgency operations in
Afghanistan. Though many specific lessons from the Soviet decade in Afghanistan are perhaps
applicable to today’s conflict, as far as this essay is concerned, more useful analysis lies with
how this era paved the way for civil war and the rise of the Taliban.

Afghanistan’s precipitous downfall began in 1978 when Soviet-backed leftist Afghan army
officers deposed President Muhammad Daud Khan. The communist regime that followed
attempted to transform Afghanistan along Marxist-Leninist lines, aiming to align Afghanistan
with the Soviet hegemony and secure Moscow’s largesse.7 The social and religious reforms
dictated by the new regime, however, provoked Islamists and traditionalists into an ever-growing
insurgent movement that by 1979 had gained control over most of the provinces.8 The Soviet
Union, worried that this uprising could spread to the Central Asian republics9, installed a
moderate communist leader in the hopes that this would appease the anti-regime forces.10

The loose tribal and ethnic coalition called the Mujahedeen attracted an eager league of
benefactors from the U.S. to China, who jumped at the opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union dry
through proxy war.11 While the Mujahedeen were initially quite broad in its composition, former
Afghan Army officer Ali Jalali describes how the movement became more extreme as the “U.S.
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intelligence believed that the Islamists were the most zealous and devoted anti-Soviet fighters
and deserved to be supported.”12 Jalali experienced firsthand how this aid, channeled through
similarly radical Pakistani intelligence, “marginalized mainstream Afghan forces that embraced
moderate religious and nationalistic orientation, but lacked strong leadership.”13 Through this
support and determination, the Mujahedeen claimed victory over the weary Soviet forces after
ten years of bloody conflict. The U.S. calculation to support the more radical Afghan factions
would, however, be Pyrrhic triumph. Jalali counters that “the cost of Washington’s victory in the
Afghan power game was the advancement of the Jihadi mentality which motivated a worldwide
terrorist network centered in Afghanistan.”14
Civil War ad infinitum
Immediately after the Soviet defeat, the loss of the “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” mentality
soon digressed into open war between the multitude of Afghanistan’s ethnic, religious and
political divisions. Jalali further describes this power struggle as involving “neighboring states
pursuing strategic interests, and extra-regional players with ideological, security and or economic
stakes in the chaos.” 15 In combination with what Hekmat Karzai of the Centre for Conflict and
Peace Studies characterizes as “a culture of international neglect,”16 Jalali adds that “neighboring
countries furthered their policies by engaging and supporting rival afghan factions while fueling
internal strife and blocking the emergence of a broad based legitimate government.”17 In a
statement that encapsulates the whole situation, he attests that “the turmoil was both the cause
and consequence of state failure in the war-torn country.”18

In this power vacuum of lawlessness, violence, and poverty, a group called the Taliban was
poised to gain control of Afghanistan. According to Karzai, the Taliban traces its name from the
Arabic word for “student,” a reference to its historic relationship to deeni madaris or Islamic
schools.19 However scholarly its roots, the Taliban holds to the extreme views of a dogmatic sect
of Sunni Islam called Deobandism, distinguished from moderate Islam in pursuing an active
Jihad with global ambitions.20 Empowered by U.S. contributions, the Taliban “gained in
popularity by presenting [itself] as a viable and constructive political alternative, since within
weeks [it] had restored security in the southern provinces.”21 At this juncture it is important to
note that now, as then, most Afghans value security and relative stability, perhaps even at the
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expense of severely curtailed freedoms and civil rights. Initially, however, the promise of the
Taliban included such lofty goals as those outlined by Historian Martin Ewans22:


to end the conflicts between rival Mujahedeen groups that continued to disintegrate the
country and cause lawlessness



to restore peace and security for all Afghans and protect their rights and liberties



to disarm the populace, removing weapons that were abundant after Afghan-Soviet war



to unite the people under one central government



to end the corruption by various parties and establish a credible and accountable
government



to enforce Sharia law, establish the Islamic state, and preserve the Islamic character of
Afghanistan 23

However, as time went on, the Taliban found it difficult to harmonize the pursuit of these goals
with the preservation of the “Islamic character of Afghanistan.” In view of Afghanistan’s
inherent splits, a common Islamic bond was arguably contrived. Thus, it is not surprising that the
Taliban had to resort to other methods in order maintain control. Influenced by the extremist
ideology of its backers — from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan intelligence (ISI) — the Taliban
adopted severe repression and Orwellian tactics as a political expediency.24

Furthermore, the transnational terror group Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, found this nation
an ideal host for the training and export of its brand of extremism. With jihad infrastructure left
over from the fight against the Soviets, Osama bin Laden was quickly able to mobilize further
support from many “wealthy Arabs throughout the Middle East…as [he was] were keen on
seeing a doctrine similar to Wahhabism spread across Central Asia.”25

By the end of 1997, the Taliban had imposed severe rules and regulations on of much of the
country. Karzai describes how “couples were stoned to death if caught in adultery; thousands of
widows were banned from employment; schools and colleges were closed to girls; T.V. music
and soccer were all banned.”26 Significantly, as the Taliban reneged on their social contract, it
saw Afghans voting with their feet as they “sought to remove their children from the scene in
order to evade conscription into the front-line action against the Northern Alliance.”27 Journalist
Ahmed Rashid uses stronger language to explain that the Taliban’s ethos was “utterly alien to
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Afghan culture and tradition.”28 With this growing disquiet, the quick initial fall of the Taliban
after the coalition invasion in 2001 is largely attributable to groups such as the Northern Alliance
and others who had long chafed under Taliban rule.29
Obstacles to a New Afghanistan
In a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations, Senator Kerry quoted a U.S. military officer
who told him with frustration, “We haven’t been fighting in Afghanistan for eight years. We’ve
been fighting in Afghanistan for one year, eight times in a row.”30 Rashid documents how the
American plan initially rejected nation-building, as President Bush had declared as late as
September 26, 2001, “We are not into nation-building, we are focused on justice.”31 As the
obvious need for aid became apparent, a large coalition of international military and
reconstruction forces under U.N. and U.S. direction became involved. Initially this nationbuilding impetus was tempered with Secretary of State Collin Powell’s qualification that “It isn’t
a huge Marshall Plan kind of investment.”32 With such vague goals and shortsighted revenge, the
major international players have been caught off guard with the Hobbesian decline of
Afghanistan.

Militarily, U.S. planners also failed to understand the changing nature of conflict in an age of
laser-guided bombs and predator drones against soldiers on horseback. It is easy to underestimate
the degree to which the Vietnam War continues to affect American political and military thought
and practice. Warfare for American forces has become characterized by a style of combat first
proven in the first Gulf War, one that stresses remote weapon delivery systems over conventional
infantry operations. American aversion to using ground troops in operations from Somalia
through Afghanistan testifies to U.S. leaders’ fear of another Vietnam-style war.33 U.S.
experiences in nation building have proven even less fortuitous, as Rashid reports that
Washington has been involved in just six of such operations—Cambodia, East Timor,
Haiti, Somalia, and the states of the former Yugoslavia. None of them was initiated by
the United States, except for Somalia, which failed. The United States never took part in
UN peacekeeping operations, although it has funded and supported many of them.34
The lack of a clear mission, compounded by the concurrent war in Iraq, explains much of the
past malaise in Afghanistan that the “eight, one year wars” analogy describes. In a recent address
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at West Point, President Obama did not gloss over the facts that violence is again breaking out in
the provinces, the opium trade is expanding, and the Taliban is resurfacing. The Commander in
Chief explicitly acknowledged that, “although a legitimate government was elected by the
Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy,
and insufficient security forces.”35 In committing an additional thirty thousand troops and all that
goes along with them, it appears that the U.S. will be getting serious about nation-building in
Afghanistan.
A Brave New World
With the increased security provided by the influx of troops, an exceedingly rare window of
opportunity has opened for rebuilding Afghanistan and solidifying its currently shaky
foundations. First and foremost, the availability of more troops enables the U.S. and its allies to
extend a greater tactical flexibility over a larger territory rather than remaining separated from
the general population in forward operating bases. However, this operation must be done with
extreme caution; propaganda painting U.S. troops seen as occupiers and killers can gain valuable
support for the Taliban’s cause. Karzai points out that “Operations where force is used should be
controlled, because if one innocent civilian is killed, it diminishes the goodwill of a whole
family, a community and a tribe.”36 More and more attention is being paid to winning the hearts
and minds of Afghans37 because a viable Afghan government must beat the Taliban at providing
security and order. Unequivocally, General William Wallace posits that conflicts like that in
Afghanistan can be won “only by conducting military operations in concert with diplomatic
informational and economic efforts. Battlefield success is no longer enough; final victory
requires concurrent stability operations to lay the foundation for lasting peace.”38 39

If violence is ousted from the outer provinces and security nominally restored, the central
government in Kabul will be able to spread its reforms and services to those who are currently
isolated. Any government must have the infrastructure to provide public goods and services to its
citizens. Therefore roads, electricity, and communication networks must be set up and
maintained. The current situation in Afghanistan is analogous to that of San Francisco if all
bridges in and out of the city were all destroyed and the only way in to the area was through the
southern base of the peninsula. While increased troop numbers will help provide basic needs and
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basic infrastructure, the political, economic, and agriculture reforms discussed later will prove
ineffective unless these can first be secured.
Unlimited Liability
The largest challenges to a viable Afghanistan are governmental corruption and staggering
economic hurdles. While the 2009 Transparency International rankings listed Afghanistan at 179
out of 180 countries in terms of perceived governmental corruption (from least to most), the
amount of international involvement in Afghanistan certainly separates it from Myanmar at 178
and Somalia at 180.40 Thus while this number is unfortunate, it is pragmatic to expect such a
rating from a country only recently thrust into democracy. This conclusion is not to say that this
level will be forever acceptable, but rather that incremental improvements should be pursued.

Ultimately the largest roadblocks in Afghanistan’s development are represented in the U.N.’s
Human Development Index. The HDI measures such criteria as “a long and healthy life, access
to knowledge, and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita.” 41 HDI 2009
places Afghanistan with a composite score of .352 out of 1, second only to Niger, whose .340
puts it at the bottom of the scale. In comparison with its Central Asian neighbors, Tajikistan
earns a .688, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan .710 each, Turkmenistan a .739, and Kazakhstan a
.804.42 When the HDI is extrapolated with figures from the CIA World Factbook, the seriousness
of these problems is clear.43

The median age of the Afghanistan’s population is 17.6 years old and 44% of the population is
between the ages of 0 to 14, while only 2.4% is over 65.44 While this rate is concurrent with that
of a population that has suffered 30 years of war and out-migration, it more worryingly attests to
the low levels of medical access in a country where life expectancy is 44.6 years.45 Furthermore,
if such a young populace were educated, such an age discrepancy would not be as critical. As
things stand, literacy rates are 43.1 percent for males and an incredibly low 12.6 percent for
females, who on average complete only four years of school.46 Even four years is surprisingly
high considering the Taliban prohibition on female education. As 24% of the population is
urbanized, it is apparent that a large uneducated cohort will need to be integrated into the
national economy if Afghanistan is to grow.47
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The impending human capital crisis is compounded by Afghanistan’s hobbled economy,
dependent largely on illicit opium trade. The World Factbook calculates that if the country’s
entire poppy crop were processed it would yield 648 metric tons of pure heroin.48 An opiumbased economy is a huge dilemma for the new government since according to economist Alastair
Mckenchnie, the crop comprises 35 percent of GDP and “employs as many as 2 million
people.”49 Unfortunately, the greater evils of opium production include funding insurgent forces
as well as contributing to “other criminality such as the appropriation of custom revenues and
illegal taxation, trafficking in people and body organs, forced labor, practices similar to slavery,
export of archeological artifacts, arms trading, land seizures, and real estate speculation based on
armed force or corruptly obtained contracts.”50

Reducing or eliminating the opium trade would tremendously reduce governmental corruption
and other societal ills. However, the catch is that with everyone wanting a piece of the pie,
curtailing production becomes a nearly impossible endeavor without incurring significant
political and economic costs. While reliance on a single crop will never lead to long-term
economic development, cotton monoculture in Uzbekistan demonstrates that the short-term costs
are also unsustainable if Afghanistan wishes to join the licit world economy. Mckenchnie
presents an ugly circle in which continued opium reliance leads to further corruption, diminished
government capacity and rule of law, and finally to increased macroinstability.51 While
additional coalition forces will largely reduce the rate of poppy growing, the problem with
corruption and a lack of suitable economic replacements remain Afghanistan’s limiting factors.
A New Way Forward
Taken as a whole, the disastrous recent history of Afghanistan coupled with current economic,
societal, and political disorder adds up to an exceedingly difficult equation with an ever-elusive
solution. Like a puzzle whose pieces are always changing shape, Afghanistan’s final
configuration will prove difficult to determine. Nevertheless, new study of what makes societies
and nations fail or succeed is increasingly useful in plotting out a rough map of Afghanistan’s
future development requirements. Paul Collier, former director of Development Research at the
World Bank and current economic professor at Oxford University, has moved past common
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assumptions on what makes countries poor and offers solutions through quantitative analysis.

Collier, in his book The Bottom Billion, focuses significantly on how proper governance affects
growth and whether growth can be attained with poor governance.52 He finds that while good
governance can improve the growth by up to 10%, terrible governance can destroy the economy
much more decisively.53

Extrapolating his findings to Afghanistan is especially troubling given its high government
corruption and economic immaturity. Fortunately, a growing economy can exist under a poor
government if certain criteria can be met. Bangladesh is the model here, as its economy
continues to grow despite being plagued by poor governance and a recent military takeover.54 55
Bangladesh’s government, although corrupt, adopted relatively liberal export policies that
enabled it to export large amounts labor-intensive goods competitively.56 Collier writes, “the
government merely has to avoid doing harm rather than actively doing much good; exporters
simply need an environment of moderate taxation, macroeconomic stability and a few transport
facilities.”57 Such reforms are especially appealing for Afghanistan as “such a development
strategy need not be very demanding of government” to ensure success.58 Additionally, if
Afghanistan specializes in similar high labor goods and services with moderately liberal trade
policies, the country could regain its importance as a regional trade hub. In order to achieve such
liberal trade policies, Collier presents governmental checks and balances as key in preventing
conflict and poverty. Without them, “patronage will often win out over honest politics in the
struggle for votes.”59

Collier also identifies the lack of coastal access as a large contributor to perpetual poverty, as
landlocked nations’ trade options are greatly diminished or dictated by their coastal neighbors’
whims.60 If Afghanistan were surrounded by more prosperous countries, like Switzerland in
Europe, then this would be less of a problem. However, since Afghanistan is surrounded by the
poor and landlocked nations of Central Asia, instability in any of these countries drastically
affects the others. For comparison, Collier calculates the global “spillover” average: for every
additional 1% neighboring countries grew, the neighbor country would grow by .4%.61 For
Afghanistan however, Collier posits that “globally, resource scarce landlocked countries seem to
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make a special effort to piggyback on the growth of their neighbors—for the landlocked the
spillover is not .4 percent but .7 percent.”62 Afghanistan should then orient itself to becoming a
regional trade facilitator because it has few natural resources of its own. Furthermore,
partnerships with various regional coastal nations could further its global trade exports. With
time and the improvement of other Central Asian republics’ trade policies, a Central Asian coprosperity sphere like the European Coal and Steel Community would contribute significantly to
sustained growth and economic diversification.

Many Americans view Central Asia as an inconsequential backwater, difficult to locate on a
map. However, as Collier comments, after the 9/11 attacks “the whole topic of failing states is
fashionable because people have an uneasy sense that it probably does matter.”63 For Central
Asians, a viable Afghanistan will be pivotal in the growth of their economies. Collier calculates
that over its history, a failed state can cost itself and its neighbors $100 billion in total.64 If
applied to Central Asia, a wider regional community is imperative to giving millions of people
significantly higher standards of living.

In the past, the U.S. has led the international community in pursuing nation-building in
Afghanistan with inconsistent effort and incomplete understanding. However, with the recent
influx of security forces and other resources to aid Afghanistan’s fledgling democracy, a new
chapter has been opened in the region’s history. This opportunity must not be wasted and
historical mistakes must be learned from and corrected. Collier writes, “Donors should be
committed for the decade not just the first couple of high-glamour years” and also, “International
security forces should likewise be committed for the long haul.”65 Ultimately Afghanistan and
the neighboring nations bear the responsibility for their futures and serious reform must be taken
in order to ensure success. The current obstacles at the crossroads are great, and the easy
solutions have already been tried. However, if and when Central Asia is able to overcome such
impediments, the benefit to their people and the world will far outweigh current costs.
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